History appears to be staring us in the face.
While President Joe Biden and Russian president Vladimir Putin lock horns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, historians remind us that it wasn’t all that long ago when two other East vs. West leaders flexed their muscles and came eye-ball-to-eyeball, each waiting for the other to flinch.
61 years ago, the U.S. and Soviet Union, were on the brink of a nuclear exchange over missiles in the island of Cuba. Only after some shrewd diplomacy between both leaders, a mutual level of trust, and some skilled news management (mostly by the White House), was catastrophe avoided and a diplomatic resolution reached without war breaking out.
British historian Max Hastings' well researched and superbly written new book, "The Abyss: Nuclear Crisis Cuba 1962" recounts the high drama and nervous tension that took place between the White House and Kremlin.
The Cuban Missile Crisis might have been 61 years ago, but the skill with which Hastings revisits those 13 jittery days in October, 1962, you'd think you were watching a blockbuster Netflix drama.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk called it the "most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen." White House Counsel, Ted Sorensen, referred to it as the "Gettysburg of the Cold War"; while Kennedy Special Assistant and "Court Historian", Arthur Schlesinger Jr., described it as the "finest hour'' of the Kennedy presidency.
The drama began on October 16, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy was shocked beyond belief when he was presented with indisputable evidence that the Soviets had placed medium-range (1,100 miles) and intermediate missiles (2,200) in Cuba, a mere 100 miles off the coast of the United States.
Not only was Kennedy stunned, but he felt deceived and lied to. It was only in September of that year, after all, when Kennedy’s brother, Robert Kennedy, the U.S. Attorney-General, met with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, who conveyed Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s personal guarantee that no surface-surface-missiles had been placed in Cuba.
Khrushchev was hoping to sneak the missiles into Cuba without the U.S. noticing; so that on November 7, on the 45th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, he would announce to the world what he had done in a bold attempt to close the missile gap or “level the playing field.”
Fortunately for the U.S., the missiles were discovered early enough before they became operational. Still, Kennedy knew he had to act decisively and quickly before they became operational.
President John F. Kennedy meets with members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) regarding the crisis in Cuba.
Photo Credit: JFK Library and Presidential Museum, Boston
***
Before deciding how to respond, Kennedy formed an Executive Committee (which became known as EXCOMM), comprised of members of the National Security Council.
The committee was made of some heavy hitters, including: Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense), Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Maxwell D. Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Paul Nitze (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) and Robert Kennedy (Attorney-General), among others.
The Cuban Missile Crisis has been held up by many historians, including Max Hastings, as classic case study of crisis management and what to do and not to do when international crisis strikes, which makes it still relevant today.
When EXCOMM first assembled, most members, took a hawkish stance, strongly advising the president that military action was needed, probably air strikes (to take out the missiles) followed by a land invasion.
From the very start, the room became uncomfortably heated. Most thought a strong offensive was the only way to send Khrushchev a message that the United States couldn’t be pushed around. Many additionally articulated the belief that if Kennedy didn’t respond aggressively to this blatant act of deception, who knows what kind of duplicity the Soviets might take in the future.
In addition to responding to the Soviets, John Kennedy, only 44 years old, needed to send his own country a message that he had the mettle for the job and couldn’t be bullied by Khrushchev despite his youth and inexperience in foreign policy.
Kennedy, after all, was coming off of the disastrous and embarrassing Bay of Pigs fiasco (April, 1961) when the U.S. military invasion in Cuba failed to overthrow Fidel Castro, the belligerent communist leader. Then, just six weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna (June, 1961), which was equally disastrous for the youthful U.S. President. He ended up engaging the Soviet leader in communist ideology and simply was unprepared (and over his head) for such a weighty discussion with the well-seasoned 61-year-old Soviet leader, who, many observed, walked all over him. Kennedy later, privately, told New York Times Washington Bureau Chief, James “Scotty” Reston, that the summit was the “worst thing in my life…he [Khrushchev] savaged me.”
So, when the Cuban Missile Crisis presented itself, you would think that Kennedy would feel the overwhelming need to take aggressive action in Cuba. The 1962 mid-term elections were looming, and many Democrats were already questioning Kennedy’s chances of re-election in the 1964 presidential election.
If Kennedy botched Cuba, he knew he was destined to be a one-term president.
Surprisingly, whatever course of action Kennedy finally decided on, politics and the upcoming elections took a back seat in his decision making.
The EXCOMM’s meetings resulted in multiple options being discussed, revised, debated, debated some more, before deciding on a course of action.
As the president’s advisors pushed for military action, it was Robert McNamara, the defense secretary, who first proposed something new, a naval blockade, as an aggressive action without having to fire a shot. When McNamara first proposed the idea, it did grab the attention of other EXCOMM members, but of all the options discussed, the naval blockade or quarantine appeared to be the weakest option.
History will look fondly on Kennedy for having the courage to weigh all the options carefully before endorsing the idea of a naval blockade, which called for the U.S. military forming a “ring of ships around Cuba” (that is, a quarantine) to prevent any Soviet ships from transporting additional cargo into Cuba.
Some of the best minds, the “best and brightest,” cheered military action, but it was Kennedy who ultimately made the decision to embrace the quarantine, giving Khrushchev time to rethink keeping missiles in Cuba before war broke out.
Kennedy would later say, “if we had to act in the first 24 hours, I don’t think probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did.”
The other remarkable feature of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the way Kennedy was able to manage the news, and keep his plans for a quarantine under a cloak of secrecy.
President John F. Kennedy delivers a radio and television address to the nation (October 22, 1962) regarding the Soviet Union’s military presence in Cuba. Oval Office, White House, Washington, D.C.
Photo Credit: JFK Library and Presidential Museum, Boston
***
Before taking his case to the American people in a nationally televised address on October 22, the White House was hearing whispers that the Washington Post and New York Times, in particular, were piecing things together and were planning to report on the U.S. response to Cuba.
Kennedy personally telephoned New York Times’ publisher Orville Dryfoos and Washington Post publisher Philip Graham to request they refrain from publishing any details of his ultimatum to Khrushchev. The Post agreed immediately, the New York Times, especially James “Scotty” Reston, reportedly had to think about it before deciding to hold his fire.
Philip Brenner, Professor of International Relations at American University, told me that even Kennedy’s press secretary Pierre Salinger wasn’t aware of the EXCOMM meetings (until the night of Kennedy’s televised address on October 22), because “Kennedy thought it would be easier for him to lie to the press if Salinger did not know the truth.”
Readers of Hastings book couldn’t help but wonder if the debates of the Cuban Missile Crisis had happened during Joe Biden’s administration, would the West Wing have been as successful in preventing details from leaking out?
James G. Hershberg. Professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University, doubts that it would. “There are far more extremists around in Congress, the media, social media, and blogosphere,” Hershberg explained, “who couldn't care less about being responsible, and would happily ignore or violate official pleas just to up their audience and promote their case.”
And Renata Keller, associate professor of history at the University of Nevada, Reno, who focuses on the Cold War and international history, echoes Hershberg’s sentiments. “The close relationship that previous U.S. presidents (but especially Kennedy) had with the press has declined considerably over time due to a number of factors, including the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the rise of the internet and social media. I think it's harder to keep anything secret these days.”
In addition to his deft management of the news cycle, Kennedy fostered a level of bipartisanship when planning his response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. It was important for Kennedy to inspire “unity on the home front.” He telephoned Dwight D. Eisenhower and urged that the Republicans not make the Cuban Missile Crisis partisan.
Today, the word “bipartisanship” is an ugly word and rarely invoked in the halls of Congress. But the political climate in Washington was much different 61 years ago.
Just hours before Kennedy’s October 22nd address to the nation, Charles A. Halleck (Republican leader in Congress) and other congressional leaders were flown to the White House from all around the country (Congress was in recess) where they were informed of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Both Halleck and GOP Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), among other Republicans, were shocked of the missile revelations, but pledged their support to the president on his stated course of action.
Anyone following American politics today would have a hard time believing that Republicans in the 118th Congress today would rally around President Biden if he were faced with the same international crisis.
Six days after Kennedy’s national televised address to the nation in his call for a quarantine; and after many sleepless nights and anxious moments--he and Khrushchev struck a deal on October 28th. The Soviets agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba in exchange for the United States agreeing not to attack Cuba.
An additional sweetener to the deal was the U.S. pledge to withdraw its nuclear arsenal from Turkey. This part of the deal, however, was agreed to privately and didn’t become public knowledge for quite some time. Khrushchev always maintained the missiles in Turkey could have destroyed Moscow, Kiev, and other major Soviet cities. The U.S. countered they were never operational and didn’t pose any danger.
Walter Lippmann, an influential columnist at the time, was reportedly the first to propose that the U.S. remove its missiles from Turkey in a New York Herald Tribune, October 25, 1962 column, three days after JFK’s television address.
In fact, many argue, the “turning point of the crisis” came when the U.S. agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. Others contend Khrushchev already made up his mind to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba before Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin struck a deal that both countries would remove its missiles from Cuba and Turkey.
What’s most astonishing reading about such a tense time in American diplomacy, is that the Cold War was at its zenith; one wrong move, one miscommunication, one blunder by either side, could have ignited a deadly nuclear exchange.
A misstep that practically triggered a war was when a U.S. U-2 plane, flown by Rudolf Anderson Jr., entered Cuban air space. The jittery Soviets thought he was spying on secret locations of tactical nuclear weapons near America’s Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and was prematurely shot down (and killed) on an order given by Soviet Lieutenant Stepan Grechko.
Both Khrushchev and Kennedy were quick to intervene and defuse the U-2 plane incident and avert a disastrous showdown between the two countries.
The final important lesson many come away with after reading Hastings, “The Abyss” is that both Kennedy and Khrushchev, despite being rivals, never made their confrontation personal. Unlike many of his EXCOMM advisors, Kennedy found a way to place himself in Khrushchev’s shoes. The U.S. President never wanted to embarrass or humiliate his Soviet foe. On the contrary, he wanted to give Khrushchev enough rope to extricate himself from the perilous situation without bringing his country down in a heap of flames.
Relations between Biden and Putin are so biting, bitter, and personal, you wonder whether they’re equipped with the finesse to solve their issues with reason and sound judgement (like Kennedy and Khrushchev demonstrated) and removing their personal feuds from the equation.
In lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert Kennedy would later write: “Respect is central to international relations, even between adversaries.”
The big lesson learned by Robert McNamara was that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a “political problem” not a tactical problem. Kennedy’s former defense secretary stressed, going forward, nuclear weapons should never be used to solve “political problems.”
As Max Hastings so eloquently wrote, both Kennedy and Khrushchev, held fast to a motto every national leader should embrace: “BE AFRAID!”
“Neither John F. Kennedy, nor Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev,” Hastings wrote, “was deficient in personal courage, but what distinguishes them from Fidel Castro and from some military commanders on both sides of the Iron Curtain is that the two men were prudently haunted by consequences.”
--Bill Lucey
March 4, 2023
FOOTNOTE: To give you some idea how obsessed President John Kennedy was with controlling the news cycle, here is a heated phone conversation he had with State Department spokesman, Lincoln White, who apparently issued a press statement, suggesting further action by the U.S. would be forthcoming if a peaceful solution was not found, angering JFK, because such a threatening statement was never authorized by the White House.
Cuban Missile Crisis: Additional Resources
Audio Clips from Kennedy White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (National Security Archive, George Washington University)
"To The Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis" (condensed audio with visible transcripts from EXCOMM members on what military options were being considered via Youtube)
Audio Recordings and Transcripts of advice President Kennedy received from his most trusted advisors (from The Miller Center at the University of Virginia)
